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Abstract 
 
Huge increase in the demand by the wireless sector to use the airwaves has trained focus 
on the classic policy problem of resource scarcity in the field. This article illuminates a 
part of wireless communication – unlicensed spectrum – where a particularly fractious 
debate over the future usage of such space has developed between incumbent Wi-Fi 
interests and new entrants from the field of licensed mobile communication. The case 
is novel in that private technical standards making has become a site aimed at resolving 
what is a contest for co-existence in unlicensed spectrum. In its conceptualisation of 
private technical standards making processes as communication policy activity, the 
article illuminates both their affordances and limitations. It also shows the enduring 
utility of public regulatory steer in what are, in effect, private self-regulatory processes 
aimed at creating solutions to problems with a complex socio-technical character. 
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Introduction  
Rapid growth in wireless communication has been one of the most outstanding features 
of the development of the communications sector in recent decades. Mobile 
communication, which this facilitates, for example, now comprises both standard voice 
telephonic and, for many users, Internet-based communication in all its forms. Added 
to this, customer access to the Internet in the home, organisations and outdoor public 
spaces often takes place through local area network (LAN) wireless communication 
(Wi-Fi), in the first instance. Such a huge increase in the demand by the wireless sector 
to use the airwaves has placed renewed focus on a classic communication policy 
problem: spectrum scarcity. Spectrum historically has been viewed as a highly limited 
resource whose allocation and use required careful management in the public interest 
through direct regulation. Yet one particularly interesting - though under-explored in 
public policy analysis - aspect of the burgeoning demand for wireless communication 
relates to a part of the spectrum reserved for use without a regulatory body-issued 
licence. Here, strong differences between Wi-Fi and mobile cellular 
telecommunications players over the future of this space have developed. The ensuing 
contestation and the nature of efforts to resolve it constitute the focus of this article.   
 
Wi-Fi interests are historic incumbents of the part of the unlicensed spectrum 
environment under consideration here (namely 2.4 and 5 GHz), taking advantage of the 
open entry operational approach to the use of available capacity. Mobile cellular 
players, by contrast, hail from a comparatively closed, proprietorial, control-centric 
licensed operational environment, whose cultural characteristics they have wished to 
introduce into unlicensed spaces as their interest in exploiting them (because they are 
free to enter), alongside their licensed allocation, has intensified. In such contentious 
	 4	
circumstances, direct public regulatory policy interventions might be expected to occur 
to resolve the future of the unlicensed spectrum space. Yet the article shows how this 
has not been the case. Instead, ongoing, competing technical work undertaken in several 
private standards development organisational contexts has dominated efforts to 
determine the future of the currently uneasy relationship between Wi-Fi and mobile 
broadband players. The article thus contends that private technical standards 
development has assumed a public policy making role. Activity of this kind, though 
poorly understood, is important in policy terms since technical standards establish the 
context for the development and use of new products and services. The article shows 
evidence of competing technical (which we conceive as policy) solutions to the co-
existence problem, which have aimed to shape the co-existence agenda, in an 
incompletely resolved policy process, in our terms. It illustrates, ultimately, how private 
technical standards making alone is unable to address complex socio-technical 
problems like co-existence. 
 
We illustrate and explain how organisational venues dominated by interests from the 
mobile broadband business have led work to develop technical specifications which 
articulate and present particular versions of co-existence. Historically, the Institute for 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) played the lead role in standards-making 
in the 2.4 and 5 GHz unlicensed bands.  However, in the co-existence debate, it has 
merely been able to add its own updated technical standard – and thus techno-cultural 
version of co-existence - to a group of competing techno-policy co-existence solutions. 
The article shows how standards development processes failed to resolve the key 
technical issue of energy detection levels (EDL) and mechanisms for accessing 
transmission channels in unlicensed spectrum to ensure the avoidance of collisions 
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between transmitted packets in the jointly used space. Whilst an arcane technical issue 
in one sense, in another, it demarcates essential differences in operational and cultural 
approaches of licensed mobile communications and Wi-Fi players.  
 
The article thence provides evidence of the importance of public legislative steer in the 
privately driven journey towards addressing co-existence. Here, the EU, through its 
mandating of the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), has 
provided an organisational venue for Wi-Fi actors to exert pressure on licensed 
broadband interests to reach agreement on energy detection levels that would provide 
fairer access to unlicensed spectrum for Wi-Fi services. In Europe, Wi-Fi functioning 
is based on the EN 301 893 ETSI standard, authorised politically by the EU. ETSI’s 
current standards making activity is likely to ensure that technical parameters sufficient 
to deliver  - albeit uneasy -  co-existence between licensed mobile and Wi-Fi interests 
will be written into its amended EN 301 893 wireless standard to ensure that devices 
using this standard will be operable across the EU in the future. This contains added 
resonance because of the influence of ETSI standards making for communications in 
unlicensed environments globally.  
 
To illustrate and explain its case, the article adapts and applies features of work on 
Multiple Streams (Kingdon, 1984) to the field of private technical standards making to 
illuminate why and how the co-existence problem has materialised and developed into 
a shared agenda for policy action through technical standards making. The framework 
explains the existing controversies in the wireless local area network co-existence 
debate (defined as the problem stream); examines potential solutions to the problem 
which have emerged (defined as the policy stream); and analyses pressures encountered 
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and responded to by the involved actors in the chosen standards development processes 
(defined as the political stream). 
 
The article is structured as follows. The next section sets out the main features of 
Multiple Streams analysis. This is followed by an exploration of the main 
organisational contexts for unlicensed spectrum standards making. Drawing on and 
applying the core elements of the previous two sections, the remainder of the article 
proceeds to illustrate the case of technical standards for co-existence in unlicensed 
spectrum through the problem, policy and political streams of the Multiple Streams 
approach. 
 
Analysing Standards Development as a Policy Process in Communications 
The arcane process of writing and securing agreement on technically robust, efficacious 
standards underpins future development of a plethora of new information and 
communication products and services with economic and societal ramifications. Such 
processes are multi-faceted in character and often subject to time constraints. They can 
be highly contested by a range of different actors and may evolve across a variety of 
national and international fora.  
 
In political science, the Multiple Streams approach has been developed to understand 
policy  in similarly complex environments, though it has not been deployed to date in 
the field of international specification and standards making in communications. 
Multiple Streams was, rather, in its first iteration, devised by Kingdon (1984) to assist 
the understanding of agenda setting in government policy-making. This work focused 
mostly on national level contexts and provided a detailed understanding of policy 
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environments in which the state was a prominent actor. We propose in this article that 
its features can be extended to understand international organisational environments in 
which various forms of private self-regulatory governance processes operate, in this 
case technical standards development for spectrum co-existence.  We argue that is the 
case since Multiple Streams is driven by three central concerns: first, the emergence 
and nature of key policy problems; second, the contexts within which key policy 
protagonists present potential competing policy solutions to the existing policy 
problems; and, third, key political factors that are at work in influencing the 
circumstances which lead to the linking of policy problems to potential policy solutions, 
thus setting a course of future policy action. With origins in the ‘garbage can’ model of 
Cohen et al. (1972), Multiple Streams offers a lens to explain how the policy processes 
evolve (Ackrill and Kay, 2011)  ‘under conditions of ambiguity’ (Ackrill, Kay and 
Zahariadis, 2013: 871). Mintrom and Norman (2009) emphasise the incremental nature 
of most changes (after Lindblom, 1968) which they attribute to the need to deal with 
inherent issue complexity. This includes unclearly defined actor (in our case technical) 
preferences, fluid and thus unstable participation in policy processes (in our case taking 
place across standards development organisational contexts), and ideologically 
motivated institutional settings (displaying techno-cultural differences between Wi-Fi 
and licensed operators, in our case).	In respect of the latter, there are times when policy 
problems are not solvable in designated policy settings leading to the search for 
alternatives. This can intensify as the time-based need for a solution to be achieved 
becomes more apparent. Zahariadis (2016: 6-7) notes that institutions, which we view 
broadly to incorporate organisational contexts for policy development constitute ‘an 
imperfect guide for action’ thus providing opportunity for flexibility and 
experimentation. In our case, the Broadband Random Access Networks (BRAN) 
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committee of ETSI emerged as a key venue to consider the co-existence problem and 
displayed enough organisational flexibility to allow development of the co-existence 
agenda in the direction of a solution.	
 
The Streams approach is particularly apposite for illuminating the co-existence case in 
that it envisions policy activity as developing in three initially independent streams. 
The problem stream focuses on the key issues of concern  - and often dispute - in policy 
processes. Here, focus is trained on the origins of policy problems, as well as their core 
features. Here policy problems become apparent as a consequence of evidence that a 
problem exists. This can also occur through so-called focusing events, landmark 
occurrences which highlight the problem at hand. In our case, evidence of the 
intensifying deployment of licensed mobile broadband traffic in the unlicensed space, 
thus increasing the likelihood of conflict with Wi-Fi operators, as well as technical work 
of standards setting bodies with implications for co-existence, were central to 
awareness of the co-existence problematic in the 2.4 and 5Ghz bands. 
 
Separate  - though ultimately closely related - to the problem stream, the policy stream 
explores the range of proposed solutions - or alternatives in Kingdon’s terms – that may 
exist to address policy problems. An important feature of the policy stream is that these 
solutions are not necessarily generated in a directly responsive mode to the problem at 
hand. This points to a history of often detailed work leading to products or outcomes 
whose value, in respect of a problem at hand, only becomes realised at an apposite 
moment in time. This implies that the alternatives presented in the policy stream may 
have been developed with a different initial purpose than to address directly the evident 
problem. They may, in fact, assume that the latter does not exist. This feature of 
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Multiple Streams makes it a particularly insightful tool to understand the case of co-
existence. Technical standards to exploit unlicensed Wi-Fi and licensed mobile 
broadband spectrum environments, respectively, were developed in separate – though 
also overlapping – technical (or policy, in Streams terminology) communities across an 
incremental historical trajectory. The primary aim was to exploit the available resource 
for communication purposes. It was implicitly assumed that the technical standards in 
question could ensure co-existence with other users.  
 
Yet, the problem stream, in our case, indicated that this was not so. As the article shows, 
further action was needed to ensure the linking of the co-existence problem stream with 
a potential policy solution. Understanding this linkage mechanism, termed coupling, is 
a key focus of Multiple Streams analysis, which aims to illuminate the circumstances 
when the problem and policy streams are ready to connect with each other. This could 
occur when both a problem is widely recognised as being significant enough to search 
for a solution and that it is understood that a range of potential policy solutions may be 
in existence. However, for coupling to occur effectively, the Streams approach argues 
that the intervention of a policy entrepreneur is necessary.  
 
Policy entrepreneurs, which for us can be individual or organisational (Cram, 1994), 
expend significant resources to advocate for policy development in a direction they 
favour (Kingdon, 2011). In complex and ambiguous situations they can ‘craft 
contestable meaning’, which for us can include technological meaning. They also 
‘pursue strategies to join together problems and policies into attractive packages’ 
(Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013: 873), through the coupling process. We extend the 
idea of  ‘attractive packages’ to mean acceptable technical standards. The policy 
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entrepreneur plays a key active role in coupling problems to potential solutions when 
the time for doing so is appropriate or, in Multiple Streams terms, when a policy 
window exists. Policy windows are moments or contexts when change is ripe to take 
place and can form in the problem stream. These ‘constitute triggers that delimit and/or 
help frame the way issues are debated’ (Ackrill, Kay and Zahariadis, 2013: 873; 
Kingdon, 1995). Here problems and policies become clear and their potential linkage 
to create a change in future policy action becomes an issue considered vital to resolve.  
Policy windows serving the same purpose also form in what the Multiple Streams 
literature refers to as the political stream.  
 
In Kingdon’s (1984) original work, two core elements of the political stream are the 
actions of national governments or parliaments and what was termed as the national 
mood. We argue that these features are particularly useful in understanding the 
evolution of the case of co-existence. First, it is important to acknowledge that the world 
of international standards making is different from the issues of national policy making 
envisoned in the political stream originally. However, in the case of co-existence in 
unlicensed spectrum, we show that political-legislative change in wireless 
communications at the European Union level in the shape of the 2014 Radio Equipment 
Directive (European Parliament and Council, 2014) was a key political condition 
leading to the development of the work on co-existence analysed in this article, since it 
necessitated technical standards making activity to ensure compliance with it.  
 
Second, the idea of the ‘national mood’, or perspectives and preferences of citizenry, 
as a key political factor in policy change is also important in understanding co-
existence. Applied to the context of technical standards making in this article, we 
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extend its definition into the specific context of common consumer and user behaviours 
and preferences in wireless communication. Technical standards development, 
conducted in specialist organisational contexts, takes place away from the day-to-day 
experience of consumers. Yet, those leading it are highly cognisant of  - and sensitive 
to -  current and likely future consumer preferences and usage patterns. Here, as more 
people use their mobile phones to access the Internet, the practice of ‘offloading’ has 
become popular, where users switch between licensed mobile and Wi-Fi services, when 
the latter are available. It has been predicted that offloading will have risen from 54% 
to 59% of all total mobile data traffic from all mobile connected devices between 2017 
and 2022 (Cisco, 2019). Coupled with the established feature of regular mobile handset 
upgrading, the need for new handsets to incorporate the latest licensed and Wi-Fi based 
functionality  is an important feature of the political stream of the co-existence debate.  
The article shows how political-legislative and consumer public factors provided a 
window of opportunity in the political stream to allow it to be coupled with the problem 
and policy streams in the consideration of co-existence. We develop this analysis in 
detail in the remainder of the article.  
 
Standards Development for Co-existence: Organisational Contexts and Salience 
Spectrum capacity in the so-called ISM (industrial, scientific and medical) bands (e.g. 
902-928 MHz, 2.4 GHz, 5.7-5.8 GHz frequency bands) was highly exclusive initially 
in its uses (e.g. cordless phones, microwave ovens, military radars) (Guvenc et al., 
2011, p. 6-7). In 1985, however, the US Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
undertook the key regulatory measure to open the ISM bands for wireless 
communications on a licence-exempt basis, provided that they did not create 
interference with primary and secondary occupancy rights holding users of spectrum, 
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such as the military and, by contrast, terrestrial broadcasters. In 1997, the FCC made a 
second important intervention through releasing an additional 300 MHz of frequencies 
for unlicensed use by short range, high-speed wireless communication devices in the 
5GHz band (Cooklev 2004: 10).1 Whilst monitoring the development of unlicensed 
communication, it thereafter adopted a hands-off role in the sector’s evolution which 
has persisted to the time of writing (confirmed by authors’ interviews, July 2017 and 
July 2018). Instead, the IEEE’s Committee 802, Subcommittee 11 (hereafter IEEE 
802.11) developed as a key private venue for standards development work that would 
shape wireless short-range communications. Created in 1990, IEEE 802.11 introduced 
its first standard in 1997 and, by 2000, the organisation had two standards for the use 
of unlicensed spectrum - IEEE 802.11a and IEEE 802.11b (Greenstein, 2007: 13-14). 
These and the subsequently developed versions of the 802.11 standard (most 
importantly for the ongoing co-existence contestation, the 802.11ax standard) became 
commonly known as Wi-Fi. From this account, it is clear that standards have a tendency 
to evolve in an incremental fashion, developing strong path developmental 
characteristics. 
 
In Europe, the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), created in 
1988 by the European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations 
(CEPT), developed a key role in the introduction of Wi-Fi. ETSI includes state 
administrations as well as major telecoms companies, manufacturers, network 
operators, service and content providers, universities and research bodies, user 
organisations, and consultancies (ETSI, 2016a). It is a ‘pay to play’ organisation with 
																																																								
1 The regulation of the bands falls within FCC’s Part-15 Rules, stipulated in Title 47 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR).  
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a stratified membership where members buy voting rights and weight through 
subscription (authors’ interview, 2017; ETSI, 2018). ETSI is one of the organisations 
officially recognised by the EU (European Parliament and Council, 2012) as a provider 
of European Standards (ENs). Within ETSI, the Broadband Radio Access Networks 
(BRAN) committee has played a role in the promotion of the 802.11 standard family 
historically (ETSI, 2016b). In fact, the EN 301 893 standard was written in part with 
the IEEE 802.11 standard in mind (authors’ interview, 12/10/16). The ETSI EN 301 
893 standard ‘instructs’ devices operating in unlicensed bands how precisely to access 
a channel. Thus, in contrast to the US, the EU, through legislation and standards 
development activity, has played a significantly more hands-on role in the development 
of Wi-Fi. It also is important to note that ETSI’s resonance for co-existence goes 
beyond the EU since it comprises as many as 865 members from 66 countries across 
five continents (ETSI 2018) and its technical specifications are thus copied by states 
beyond Europe.   
 
WiFi aside, the growth of licensed mobile communications and attendant capacity 
pressures led players in the sector to move towards developing technical specifications 
and standards to allow use of unlicensed spectrum space, through a process known as 
offloading, based on the Long Term Evolution (LTE) technical standard which 
underpinned licensed operators’ services historically. This involved technical work 
aimed at creating new LTE-based specifications to secure a more controlled use of the 
unlicensed space in the less crowded 5 GHz bands. To utilise the available capacity in 
these bands, key initiatives have occurred in the LTE-U (Long Term Evolution – 
Unlicensed) Forum and a formal institutional standard setting process undertaken 
within the much larger 3rd Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) (see below). 
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Established in 1998, 3GPP has defined technical specifications for advanced cellular 
communications, originating from ‘a 3rd generation mobile system based on evolved 
Global System for Mobile Communications (GSMTM)’ (ETSI, 2016c). 3GPP work, 
building on LTE, focused on Internet Protocol (IP) based technical solutions to 
transport voice, messaging and data services over cellular networks (3GPP, 2016a). 
3GPP unites under its structure seven telecommunications standardisation bodies from 
across the world that serve as its Organisational Partners and ‘determine [its] general 
policy and strategy’ (3GPP, 2016b). Very importantly for the current co-existence 
debate, one of these partners is ETSI (see Table 1).  
 
Thus, the standards development organisation (SDO) world overall is organisationally 
nexus-like and overlapping. The membership of 3GPP is diverse and includes almost 
all major cellular, but also many Wi-Fi, related companies and alliances (see 3GPP 
2016c). The members of the LTE-U Forum are part of 3GPP. The Wi-Fi Alliance2 
industry group is also an individual member of 3GPP, while the diverse Wireless 
Broadband Alliance (WBA) 3  is one of 3GPP’s partners (3GPP, 24/10/16). The 
landscape, in policy terms, is thus interconnected and multi-forum (see Table 1). This 
interconnectedness, in theory at least, provides the opportunity for the resolution of 
conflict that might arise from different technical standards development processes. 
																																																								
2Created in 1999, the Wi-Fi Alliance has provided interoperability certification and 
approved backward compatibility of Wi-Fi CERTIFIEDTM products (Wi-Fi Alliance, 
2016a, 2016b). As seen further in this paper, the Wi-Fi Alliance has been particularly 
active in the planning of technical tests for measuring fair coexistence between LTE 
and Wi-Fi devices.  
 3Founded in 2003, the Wireless Broadband Alliance (WBA) focuses on next generation 
Wi-Fi, connected cities, wireless innovation and testing, as well as on trials of LTE 
devices in unlicensed spectrum (WBA, 2016).  	
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There is a notable difference in the participation cultures of these organisations, most 
particularly between 3GPP and IEEE 802 (authors’ interviews, 12/10/16 and 12-
13/07/17). While participation in both organisations is undoubtedly motivated by 
corporate business goals, in IEEE 802 attendees at standards development meetings 
hailing from a range of high tech corporate telecommunications players, when voting 
in any standards development process, are required to act in a personal capacity using 
their expertise to make decisions in the general or common interest of technological 
progress (see IETF RFC 7241, 2014; authors’ interviews 12-13/07/17). Attempted 
expansion of this cultural norm beyond IEEE – in the form of individual policy 
entrepreneurship -  would create a crucial window of opportunity to resolve the co-
existence problem (see p.25). 
 
 
 
Source: Authors 
 
 
Table 1: Wi-
Fi/LTE 
(unlicensed) SDOs
IEEE 802.11 
WG 
Cisco,	Intel,	Qualcomm,	Broadcom,	HP,	Nokia,	Ruckus,	Huawei,	ZTE,	Ericsson,	Samsung,		
ETSI
Cisco,	Intel,	HP,	CableLabs,	Ericsson,	Nokia,	Qualcomm,	Samsung,	Ruckus,	Broadcom,	Huawei,	ZTE,	Wi-Fi	Alliance,	European	Commission
3GPP
Regional	standardisation	bodies	(ETSI	in	Europe;	ATIS	in	USA;	CCSA	in	China;	TSDS,	India,	TTA	in	Korea,	TTC	in	Japan,	ARIB	in	Japan) and	their	individual	members
LTE-U
Verizon,	Qualcomm,	Ericsson,	Nokia,	Alcatel-Lucent	Samsung
Wi-Fi 
Alliance
Cisco,	Intel,	Qualcomm,	Broadcom,	Comcast,	Huawei,	Nokia,	Samsung,	Ericsson,	AT&T,	Boingo,	CableLabs,	HP,	Ruckus,	Alcatel-Lucent
Wireless Broadband 
Alliance 
Qualcomm,	Ericsson,	CableLabs,	Alcatel-Lucent,	Nokia,	Huawei,	BroadcomBoard	members:	AT&T,	Boingo,	Ruckus,	Cisco,	Comcast,	Intel
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The Problem Stream: Defining the Terms of Co-Existence between LTE and Wi-
Fi in Unlicensed Spectrum Space 
Spectrum usage undertaken on the basis of cellular and Wi-Fi standards (LTE and IEEE 
802.11 respectively) differs markedly. These technical differences have created 
different operational cultures and distinct tension in terms of co-existence. This can be 
understood in respect of the idea of fairness, in particular in relation to access to 
network capacity. Some brief technical explanation is needed to illustrate this. 
 
Wi-Fi devices gain access to spectral channels in a so-called ‘contention-based’ 
process, using the carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) 
technical protocol (Jeon et al., 2015: 2321). Here, an automatic ‘clear channel 
assessment’ process is performed before signal transmission occurs (Kwon et al., 2016: 
4). The contention mechanism operates by a process of trying to avoid collision using 
the so-called listen before talk (LBT) algorithm, whereby a station attempting to 
transmit selects a random listening time duration. After it has detected no user 
transmitting during this random duration, it proceeds to transmit (authors’ interview, 
12/10/2016). This is known as Wi-Fi’s ‘random backoff’ mechanism (Google, 
11/06/15). The Wi-Fi 802.11 standard family includes an additional backoff 
mechanism, called ‘exponential backoff’. Here, if a signal collision occurs, the length 
of the random backoff interval referred to above is automatically increased before 
transmission recommences, thus minimising (though not removing entirely) the risk of 
further signal interference in densely populated (known as densified) network 
environments (Jindal and Breslin, 2015 in Google (2015); see also DSA, (2015: 3); 
Public Interest Organizations, (2015: 14).  
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By contrast, cellular communication through LTE operates on a so-called ‘contention-
free’ or schedule-based system, ‘designed to transmit persistently as long as there are 
[data] packets awaiting to be served’ (Jeon et al., 2015: 2321). This provides better 
throughput for LTE based signals (Public Interest Organizations, 2015: 14) and thus 
better quality of service to the user but is problematic for co-existence since the reserved 
space it monopolises can leave Wi-Fi devices operating in the unlicensed environment 
starved of access to transmission channels, because LTE does not allow flexibility for 
the free or ‘idle’ periods of opportunity (Cano et al., 2016: 2) on which Wi-Fi capitalises 
for communication. Therefore, the inherent techno-cultural ‘politeness’ in the design 
of Wi-Fi devices creates a distinct disadvantage when operating in proximity to LTE 
transmitters as is increasingly the case in the unlicensed space, something exacerbated 
by the control-centric modus operandi of LTE. This is important, since historically: 
 
It is the combination of all three of these politeness protocols, (LBT, initial wait, 
exponential backoff) and [its] ability to sense extremely weak signals…that 
make [Wi-Fi] such a good neighbor to other technologies. (DSA, 2015a: 3). 
 
Wi-Fi stakeholders have frequently pointed out that these ‘good neighbour’ 
characteristics have also provided opportunities for innovation and deployment of other 
technologies to operate efficaciously next to it. Examples include coexistence with 
Bluetooth, Zigbee, and cordless phones in the 2.4 GHz band (DSA, 2015a: 5; Nwana 
2016: 2).  The perception of 'fair' coexistence between Wi-Fi and licensed providers 
differs markedly. The results of technical simulation exercises conducted by proponents 
of LTE are often disputed by the Wi-Fi community (Alderfer, 2015; Andreoli-Fang, 
2015).  
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A key focusing event in highlighting the co-existence problem occurred in 2014, when 
a closed group of mobile carrier, chipset, and equipment manufacturers (led by Verizon 
and also comprising Qualcomm, Ericsson, Nokia/Alcatel, and Samsung) formed in the 
United States and put forward a technical specification (LTE-U) for the deployment of 
LTE in unlicensed spectrum bands. LTE-U was intended for use by licenced mobile 
carriers only (Feld, 2015a) and excluded other players with major stakes in the Wi-Fi 
sector, including Cisco, Broadcom, Microsoft, Cablelabs, and Google, all part of the 
Wi-Fi Alliance. It operated according to a so-called ‘duty-cycle approach’, which 
performed a particularly narrow, self-first techno-cultural articulation of sharing, by 
‘owning’ spectrum for a chosen period of time and then allowing other devices (such 
as Wi-Fi) to use it in the remaining time (authors’ interview, 12/10/16; Paolini and Fili, 
2015: 12). This amounted to the cultural antithesis of WiFi based communication. 
Whilst LTE-U incorporated the Wi-Fi originated backoff mechanism, it was absent the 
‘listen before talk’ (LBT) technique (WBA, 2015). Its activated duty cycle mechanism 
would share the selected channel based on ‘on and off’ periods, which would be 
determined, crucially, by the LTE-U operators themselves on a self-regulatory principle 
(DSA 2015a: 4).  
 
The Dynamic Spectrum Alliance (DSA), an industry association sympathetic to the 
position of WiFi in the co-existence debate, argued that the mechanism would give 
control to LTE-U players to determine allocated time to Wi-Fi based counterparts, and 
would impact negatively on the real time voice and video communications opportunity 
of the latter (DSA 2015: 4). By contrast, Qualcomm refuted accusations of unfair 
coexistence (Qualcomm, 2015) by arguing that LTE-U did not impact on the 
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performance of a Wi-Fi device any more than would another Wi-Fi neighbour 
(Cablevision et al., 2015).  
 
Functionality and fairness aside, the entrance of LTE-based technology into the 
incumbent Wi-Fi space pointed up the thorny issue of international regulatory 
differences of approach to unlicensed spectrum use. In Europe and Japan, licensed 
cellular transmitters are required to deploy LBT when using unlicensed bands, 
something not specified in North America, South Korea and China (Giupponi, 2016). 
Since the ETSI EN 301 893 harmonised standard, mandated by the EU’s Radio 
Equipment Directive, required the use of LBT, LTE-U could be deployed in the key 
markets of the US, China, and India, but not in Europe. Despite creating this fraction, 
as we show below in the Political Stream section, the role of European level political  
preferences expressed through legislation was a key factor in setting the agenda for 
action to address the co-existence problem. 
 
True to their well-known laissez-faire approach, the FCC (in line with the US Congress) 
maintained the position that discussions should be carried out within and between the 
formal private technical standard-setting bodies (Feld, 2015b) (mostly 3GPP and IEEE 
802) and the relevant industry alliances (LTE-U, the Wi-Fi Alliance, and the Wireless 
Broadband Alliance). It nonetheless decided to withhold the certification of the LTE-U 
devices for operation in the United States until industry parties resolved contested 
technical claims they held. This proved an important focusing event in highlighting the 
extent of the co-existence problem. A subsequent joint coexistence test plan exercise 
developed under the auspices of the Wi-Fi Alliance. Though initially announced as a 
compromise solution, the test produced proved an unsuccessful policy window since it 
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was not endorsed by key stakeholders and there was no obligation on service providers 
and vendors to run it. The process  delayed the emergence of LTE-U based products on 
the market by a year which might have been considered as a victory in policy terms for 
the Wi-Fi community but merely served to highlight the persistence of the coexistence 
problem.  
 
In February 2017, the US FCC finally authorised the operation of LTE-U devices. 
Whilst potentially a key focusing event, the core issue of contestation in the Wi-Fi 
problematic remained: disagreement on the inherent mechanism for spectrum use by 
LTE-U technology (LBT) and the energy detection levels necessary to prevent 
interference and enable ‘fair’ access to spectrum. Energy detection levels are crucial 
since they determine the decision taken on whether or not a channel or medium is busy 
and thus whether or not the device concerned is able to transmit a signal. Nevertheless, 
by this stage co-existence as a key techno-political problematic had become widely 
recognised among  licensed and unlicensed spectrum players. 
 
The Policy Stream: LTE-LAA, 802.11ax and the Development of Unlicensed 
Spectrum Use 
 
The development of the LTE-U standard served to epitomise the co-existence problem 
rather than resolve it. However, a separate LTE-based standard development process  - 
known as LTE-LAA (Licence Assisted Access) was undertaken in an alternative 
organisational venue. This standard evolved simultaneously to - and  became closely 
connected with  - work within the Wi-Fi community of the IEEE to create the next 
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generation of  the Wi-Fi standard, known as 802.11ax. Both standards developed into 
potential policy options to address co-existence. 
 
The LTE-LAA development process was undertaken in 3GPP (whose membership 
included the founders of the LTE-U Forum) with the aim of creating a ‘single global 
solution’ that responded to the challenge of overcoming the international regulatory 
differences noted above on use of unlicensed spectrum (Paolini, 2015: 11; Flore, 2015) 
as well as technical differences over communication protocol and energy detection. 
Unlike LTE-U, a formal standard creation process commenced within 3GPP. Yet, the 
LTE-LAA standard had a particularly closed techno-cultural underpinning in that it 
catered only for licensed providers through aiming to allow aggregation, by a primary 
licensed carrier, of one or more supplemental unlicensed channels (WBA, 2015: 1). It 
did crucially, however, include the LBT mechanism for functioning in the 5 GHz band 
(Qualcomm, 2015: 2; see IEEE, 2015, also Paolini 2015: 11). In March 2016, 3GPP 
announced the near completion of work on LTE-LAA (3GPP 2016b) and devices using 
it were approved by the FCC in September 2016 (Brenner, 2018). Despite the 
incorporation of LBT, a key difference between LTE-LAA and 802.11ax remained in 
respect of the detailed specifics of energy emission.  
 
Throughout 2016 and 2017, a potential policy window opened when 3GPP and IEEE 
802.11 took part in a resolution seeking process, by communicating through liaison 
statements, initiated by the policy entrepreneurship of the IEEE 802.11 committee. The 
core of the contestation between the two sides was the seemingly obdurate employment 
by Wi-Fi and LTE-LAA of different means of detecting energy from transmissions by 
nearby devices.  
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In essence, the system used in Wi-Fi devices is more noise sensitive than that of LAA. 
This increases the risks of ‘unfair’ access and use of spectrum when both operate in the 
same bands. Whilst LAA underpinned devices are designed to operate by detecting and 
avoiding interference with transmissions using the Energy Detection (ED)-only 
mechanism with a threshold of -72 dBm (decibel-milliwatts), Wi-Fi incorporates a 
more sensitive two stage ED (at a threshold of -62 dBm) and Preamble Detection (PD) 
(at a threshold of -82 dBm) process. This PD accounts for Wi-Fi’s exceptional 
‘politeness’ characteristics.  
 
The politics of the interaction proved fractious and the policy window proved 
unsuccessful. IEEE 802 argued that 3GPP should incorporate a lower (more sensitive) 
ED threshold or include in LAA’s design a PD system for increasing the detection 
sensitivity of devices operating according to it. The 3GPP rejected this argument and 
returned a counter proposal to IEEE 802 that the latter should consider the application 
of a less sensitive ED-only mechanism with a detection threshold chosen as optimal by 
the 3GPP (i.e. -72 dBm) in the IEEE’s ongoing work on the 802.11ax standard. 
Negotiations ended in deadlock when IEEE 802 rejected this counter proposal citing 
the long established and widely deployed Wi-Fi technological legacy of which dual 
detection was an integral part. The new IEEE 802.11ax standard, first vaunted in 2013, 
and commenced formally in 2014, was scheduled for formal ratification by the end of 
2019. The standard addresses the key technological challenge of managing in a more 
controlled and more effective fashion signals in the increasingly crowded, ‘densified’, 
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spaces of unlicensed spectrum4. In this respect, 802.11ax can be regarded as a direct 
technical response to the concerns of licensed communications providers about the 
variable service quality of user experience in the unlicensed space, though it differed 
distinctly from LTE-LAA in respect of energy detection levels as a policy option to 
deliver co-existence. 
 
The ETSI Policy Window, Policy Entrepreneurship and Efforts to Couple the Co-
Existence Problem and Policy Streams 
Despite the seemingly implacable impasse in potential coupling of the problem and 
policy streams of the co-existence debate,  a policy window of opportunity emerged in 
Europe, drawing on its more public regulatory interventionist character in technical 
standards making (see next section). This led to a process to revise ETSI’s EN 301 893 
harmonised standard, which establishes the essential requirements for radio equipment 
to use spectrum efficiently and to avoid harmful interference. In an attempt to seek an 
alternative organisational venue to address the ongoing co-existence problematic, Wi-
Fi stakeholders focused on the work undertaken in ETSI’s technical committee on 
Broadband Radio Access Networks (BRAN). Importantly - in a situation of policy 
deadlock where existing standards making venues yielded merely articulations of 
difference - ETSI BRAN created a policy window by acting as a more ‘neutral’ forum 
for altering the unlicensed space technical standards making agenda towards the 
meaningful pursuit of fair coexistence terms between LAA and Wi-Fi through the EN 
301 893 revision process.  
 																																																								4	Specifically, the 802.11ax project aimed to increase traffic throughput per user by a factor of four in 
dense user contexts through ‘implementing mechanisms to serve more users a consistent and reliable 
stream of data (average throughput) in the presence of many other users’ (National Instruments, 2017, p. 
1). 	
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Here, a detailed  - and at times fractious -  debate began at the beginning of 2016. By 
mid-2017, two spectrum access options for radio equipment in unlicensed bands were 
developed and presented. Recognisable as an attempt to couple the problem and policy 
streams, these counterpart technical solutions were packaged as a co-existence policy 
compromise. This stipulated both a single energy detection threshold and a dual 
detection threshold of ED and PD, and covered versions of the Wi-Fi standard up to - 
but not including - the IEEE 802.11ax standard. The coupling process commenced with 
the initial acceptance of the package as a pragmatic outcome, as ‘it was not possible to 
allow a “carve out” for 802.11ax given it did not exist at the time’ (authors’ interview, 
July 2017).  Given the importance of 802.11ax, it was, however, agreed that the rules 
would be revisited. In the latter process, there was initially no sign of movement to a 
new technical understanding on energy detection levels, merely a trenchant tactical re-
statement of preferred positions: the licensed cellular industry in 3GPP was still 
motivated to remove the dual threshold option used by Wi-Fi, while the Wi-Fi industry 
hoped that it could convince ETSI BRAN to remove the single (ED-only) threshold. 
However, central for the Wi-Fi industry remained its desire to ensure that the 802.11ax 
standard was covered by the revised ETSI standard to allow the use of dual thresholds 
in its future products and services, as had been the case for existing similar Wi-Fi 
standard variants in ETSI’s Harmonised Standard.  
 
Evidence of collective policy entrepreneurship emerged with efforts to address the 
loggerheads at which the protagonists found themselves, through pressure exerted by 
Cisco, Intel, Broadcom, and HPE, from the Wi-Fi stakeholders’ side. These firms 
proposed to keep rules to continue with the status quo (i.e. allow both options) as 
already defined in the previous revision of the ETSI standard, but to extend these rules 
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to cover IEEE 802.11ax. Some licensed mobile network operators among 3GPP’s LTE 
stakeholders initially opposed the proposed compromise and the discussions at the 
March 2018 ETSI meeting showed no signs of consensus (authors’ interview, 2018). 
However, the position changed unexpectedly with a key piece of individual policy 
entrepreneurship from a participant associated with Ericsson (a company strongly 
interested in LTE initiatives in unlicensed spectrum), who suggested, in his personal 
capacity, a way to exit from the deadlock. This action was not in line with the 
established company membership-based decision taking cultural norm of ETSI BRAN. 
Instead, it was reminiscent of the cultural norm and modus operandi of the IEEE 802.11 
committee. In essence, the policy entrepreneur proposed that all parties take the bold 
step of accepting the still unfinalised 802.11ax standard as a so-called ‘market reality’ 
(authors’ interview, 09/05/18). 5  This proposal was accepted and completed the 
coupling process between the problem and policy streams. Furthermore, in a signal of 
clear agenda shift in the direction of the practical pursuit of co-existence, participants 
in ETSI BRAN reached a common position agreeing on the need to test real world 
coexistence performances of 802.11ax and LTE-LAA. Both ETSI and Wi-Fi Alliance 
members were requested to make coexistence test reports available, which, according 
to multiple participants, would ‘provide the industry the best hints’ on enabling 
acceptable coexistence (IEEE, 2018).  
 
 
 
																																																								
5 Interestingly, Ericsson (as a company) has since proposed the ED/PD option to be defined as an 
‘exception’, but the proposal seems to have been refused by ETSI BRAN (IEEE 802.11 Coexistence SC, 
2018).  
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The Political Stream in the Debate on Co-Existence: Policy Windows of 
Opportunity and Coupling with the Problem and Policy Streams 
 
The EU governmental stimulus provided to the standards making process in Europe by 
the 2014 Radio Equipment Directive exerted an important pressure in the political 
stream on standards developing parties. This directive replaced the 1999 Radio and 
Telecommunication Terminal Equipment Directive and, as a consequence, required the 
European Commission to mandate ETSI to revise the European EN 301 893 
Harmonised Standard. The directive was scheduled to come into effect in June 2016, 
with a mandatory compliance among EU Member States of June 2017. The EN 301 
893, however, needed to be revised earlier, in 2016, to allow approval and transition 
processes to be executed in time, thus precipitating the activity in ETSI BRAN analysed 
in the previous section. Thus, EU level political-legislative change created an important 
window of opportunity in the political stream which contributed to its coupling with 
the co-existence problem and policy streams.   
 
The second vital aspect of the political stream for standards making parties was 
awareness of the consumer public’s preferences for mobile communication in licensed 
and Wi-Fi spaces. This article has earlier outlined the interconnected nature of the 
licensed mobile broadband and Wi-Fi sectors in terms of standards making. As usage 
of laptops, tablets and mobile phones has grown, wireless communications users have 
become a vital international consumer public.  Regularly upgraded wireless devices are 
now often both Wi-Fi and LTE enabled. This is particularly important for mobile 
phones, which are used increasingly to access the Internet, often through utilising the 
process of switching or ‘offloading’ between licensed and Wi-Fi  services. Design and 
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manufacture of new dual mode enabled equipment is thus both costly and something 
subject to significant commercial time pressures, yet at the same time potentially highly 
lucrative. Industry analysis predicted that whilst latest fifth generation (5G) licensed 
mobile services will provide customers with increased data allowances and connection 
speeds, ‘new application demands on 5G are also going to move 
upwards…encouraging similar behaviours of offload as 4G’ (Cisco, 2019) in the future. 
As pointed out at IEEE 802.11, the dual threshold was included in an earlier version of 
the EN 301 893 Harmonised Standard and acknowledgment made that any drastic 
change of rules would jeopardise existing economic and social benefits of Wi-Fi to 
European citizens (IEEE, 2017). EU policy makers have advocated a technological 
neutrality approach in regulating electronic communications. The IEEE 802.11 
community argued that extension of the dual threshold in the revision of EN 301 893 
would achieve such neutrality without putting at risk the socio-economic value 
associated with the additional benefits of IEEE 802.11ax for the European community 
(IEEE, 2017).   
 
The previous section has shown how, as the coupling process between the problem and 
policy streams unfolded, the crucial latest version of the 802.11 standard, according to 
which a raft of new equipment would be built and sold, could not be covered initially 
as the standards making process had not yet been completed. The incomplete 802.11ax 
standard development process raised the prospect of devices underpinned by it not 
being operable in Europe. This, in theory, would have knock on consequences for 
devices, such as laptops, incorporating the 802.11ax standard, but also LTE-based use 
in the case of dual mode mobile phones. The latter devices might not be ascribed as 
enabled with the latest WiFi technology, making them considerably less attractive to 
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customers as a whole. Awareness among standards making interests of the two crucial 
public preferences for regular device upgrades, on the one hand, and smooth transition 
and interoperability on mobile devices between licensed and unlicensed Wi-Fi 
environments (authors’ interview, 2017; pwc, 2015) created another important window 
of opportunity in the political stream.  
 
Thus, commercial pragmatism based on evidence of public consumer preference (or 
public mood in Multiple Streams parlance) was a key factor alongside the legislative 
compliance requirements of the EU Radio Equipment Directive, in coupling the co-
existence political stream to the problem and policy streams. As Qualcomm, a key 
advocate of LAA, asserted ‘Wi-Fi connectivity is in hundreds of millions of Qualcomm 
chips sold each year and embedded into the smartphones and tablets that [licensed] 
service providers and manufacturers sell to consumers’, therefore LTE stakeholders 
‘have every incentive to achieve fair coexistence’ (Qualcomm, 2015).   
 
A contested policy environment in which the material interests of the protagonists are 
understood to be linked and common and in need of time pressured attention is more 
likely to lead to compromise shared policy agendas. The overall features of the three 
streams in respect of the co-existence debate analysed in this article are summarised in 
Table 2. 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 2: Applying Multiple Streams to the Case of Co-Existence in 
Unlicensed Spectrum 
 
 
 
      Technical Standards  
    
LTE    IEEE 802 
 
 
Problem stream   contention free contention based 
     Space control  Space sharing 
     Quality of service Provision of access 
     No LBT  LBT 
     Single EDT  Dual EDT 
 
 
 
Policy Stream   LTE-LAA   802.11ax 
     LBT    LBT 
     Single EDT   Dual EDT 
 
 
Political Stream      
 
EU Radio Equipment Directive (Parliamentary/legislative) 
ETSI standard EN 301 893 revision (technical/legislative) 
Seamless licensed-unlicensed use through offloading 
(consumer/public preferences) 
Regular reception equipment upgrades (consumer/public 
preferences)   
 
Source: Authors 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Conclusion 
 
The technical standards for co-existence process amounts to a European legislation 
mandated, consumer public driven, compromise based on acceptance of two 
incrementally developed standards families, likely to sit uneasily aside each other in 
the unlicensed environment. In other words, the co-existence agenda set by this 
compromise is unlikely to assuage immediately concerns about fair access to 
communication space. It appears that IEEE 802.11 has achieved its goals of ensuring 
that LBT remains a predominant communication protocol in unlicensed spectrum and 
of convincing ETSI BRAN members to allow the use of traditional ED and PD 
mechanisms through the newly designed IEEE 802.11ax standard. Yet, at the same 
time, Wi-Fi interests had to accept the single energy detection threshold (of -72 dBm) 
for LAA devices as adopted by 3GPP as a feature of the landscape of co-existence in 
an increasingly utilised unlicensed spectrum space. The opportunity ETSI has opened 
as a seemingly more neutral venue for coexistence decision-making, provided a policy 
window to set in train the first steps of consensus-building and, most importantly, a 
common agenda on the need for generation and consideration of in-practice coexistence 
test data. 
 
The co-existence case shows that private technical standards making, like complex 
policy processes, can create compromise technical outcomes. Fractious policy 
development processes can lead in the end to a clearer understanding of common 
interests, the ultimate one in this case amounting to commercial risk in a highly 
lucrative sector.  The technically arcane co-existence debate has provided a vital way 
of setting the ground for an understanding of the direction in which the wireless 
communications environment is proceeding in user terms.  Put simply, consumers are 
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unlikely to know or care about the technical standard that underpins their core 
preference for affordance of ready and efficient access to data rich, interactive mobile 
communications through regularly upgraded reception equipment.  
 
The historic mandating of LBT in Europe, through the EU and ETSI, inserted it as the 
established and predominant cultural and operational norm of unlicensed 
communication in Europe and beyond. This created a window of opportunity for 
negotiation on the seemingly insolvable issue of energy detection. Policy flexibility and 
compromise were necessary to achieve regulatory compliance, where the Wi-Fi 
community accepted inclusion of the LTE community’s less sensitive EDL; the LTE 
community accepted the 802.11ax standard, though not complete, as a market reality. 
Applying the Multiple Streams approach to the co-existence case  allows us to see 
clearly how private technical standards-setting on its own when viewed through a 
policy process lens, struggles to solve, unaided, complex socio-technical problems like 
co-existence with issues of control and quality of user experience versus openness and 
equality of opportunity in communication at their core. 
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